By: Michael J. Neary
Employers should examine their pregnancy accommodation policies to ensure compliance with a recent Supreme Court decision interpreting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Supreme Court vacated a lower court ruling granting summary judgment in favor of UPS on Peggy Young’s pregnancy discrimination claim.
Young worked as a delivery driver for UPS. During her pregnancy, Young’s doctor imposed a lifting restriction for the first 20 weeks of pregnancy that conflicted with her job responsibilities. To comply with her doctor’s orders, Young requested an accommodation from UPS. The shipment company denied the accommodation request because it accommodated other employees with similar restrictions only if those restrictions arose from on-the-job injuries. Rather than accommodate Young’s request for lighter duty, UPS placed her on unpaid administrative leave. Young then sued UPS for pregnancy discrimination.
In its ruling, the Supreme Court determined Young generated sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. In the process, the court explained the evidentiary burdens on the parties in a pregnancy discrimination case.
Employers Should Establish Accommodation Policies to Avoid Discrimination Claims
Following Young, a plaintiff may sue for pregnancy discrimination if she requested a pregnancy-related accommodation that the employer refused while accommodating others similar in their ability or inability to work. An employer can defend against such a claim by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying the accommodation. That reason, however, normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those accommodated that were similar in their ability or inability to work as the pregnant employee. If the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the denial of the accommodation request, the plaintiff may still show the reason was a pretext to mask pregnancy discrimination. According to the court, one way a plaintiff can show pretext is by presenting sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies, leading to the denied accommodation, impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are not sufficiently strong enough to justify that burden.
The significance of Young was diminished somewhat because amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act and changes in many state laws made effective after the facts in Young occurred, already shifted the landscape regarding employer obligations to accommodate pregnant employees in many respects. For instance, Maryland, enacted a pregnancy accommodation law while the Young case worked its way to the Supreme Court (for more guidance on Maryland, see "The Reasonable Accommodations for Pregnant Workers Act Creates New Obligations for Maryland Employers" and for more on DC, see "DC Employers Must Accommodate Pregnancy, Childbirth, Breastfeeding and Related Conditions"). Yet, with the shifting landscape already well under way, Young serves as a powerful reminder to employers that the days of dealing with pregnancy accommodation requests on the fly are over, and the time is now to create well thought out pregnancy accommodation policies.
Michael Neary is an attorney who counsels employers on compliance with federal employment statutes and regulations like the Family and Medical Leave Act, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. For more information about creating policies to accommodate pregnant workers, contact Michael at (301) 657-0740 or mjneary@lerchearly.com.
This article was originally featured in the Lerch Early Employment & Labor Legal Update. To subscribe, visit http://www.lerchearly.com/publications/408-subscribe-now.
